I. Introduction
One of the key terms in contracts between hospitals and insurers is how the parties apportion the financial risk of treating unexpectedly costly patients. At one extreme are contracts that pay on a unit-price basis, depending on the treatments that the hospital and its affiliated physicians determine are medically necessary at the point of service. These payment systems are sometimes described as "fee-for-service" or "low-powered. " At the other extreme are contracts that pay on a lump-sum basis, independent of the level of services provided, depending only on the medical condition of the patient. These payment systems are sometimes described as "prospective" or "high-powered. "
In practice, payment systems are neither purely fee-for-service nor purely prospective, but some mix of the two (McClellan 1997) . The optimal mix of fee-for-service and prospective payment in any particular case involves a trade-off. On one hand, more prospective payment gives hospitals incentives to contain costs; on the other hand, it Laurence Baker, Stanford University and NBER. M. Kate Bundorf (corresponding author, bundorf@ stanford.edu), Stanford University and NBER. Aileen Devlin, MIT. Daniel P. Kessler, Stanford University and NBER. creates incentives to skimp on the care of and avoid patients who are difficult to treat (Newhouse 1996; Ellis 1998) .
Prospective payment has been extensively studied in the context of the Medicare program, which has paid hospitals according to its own Prospective Payment System (MPPS) since 1984. However, much less attention has been given to the use of prospective payment by commercial insurance plans. This is not surprising. The terms of commercial insurance contracts are the result of confidential bargaining, and until recently, commercial claims data had not been used to characterize these contracts.
This paper seeks to fill this gap. We use data from the Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI) on more than five million claims from 1,288 hospitals to construct a measure of the extent of prospective payment for inpatient hospital services supplied to nonelderly commercially insured patients in 303 metropolitan statistical areas for 2008-12. For each hospital in each year, we estimate a regression of the log of the hospital's allowed amounts (including patient copayments) on a set of diagnosis-related group (DRG) fixed effects; the R 2 from these regressions are the hospitals' commercial insurance "prospectivity. " We also construct an analogous measure of the extent to which MPPS pays hospitals prospectively; because MPPS is the largest single hospital payment system in the United States, it is a natural benchmark against which commercial prospectivity can be compared.
Then, we examine the empirical relationship between our measure of prospectivity and three factors that economic theory suggests might affect the terms of incentive contracts. First, competition among hospitals can expand the use of prospective payment, because it may be in the interest of a party with bargaining power to demand low-powered contracts in addition to high prices (Choi and Triantis 2012) . As we discuss below, this results from the fact that health services have multiple attributes with interrelated demands (Spence 1975) . Second, economic theory predicts that hospitals that serve patients with health-maintenance organization (HMO) or point-of-service plan (POS) insurance, 1 rather than preferred-provider organization (PPO) insurance, will be more likely to have high-powered contracts for a similar reason. HMOs and POS plans generally have more narrow networks than PPO insurance, and narrow networks may limit hospitals' ability to exercise their bargaining power (Dafny et al. 2017 ). Third, research on "spillovers" shows how payment systems can influence the care of patients other than those to which they apply (e.g., Chernew, Baicker, and Martin 2010) . For this reason, the share of patients at a hospital paid by MPPS could affect the extent of prospective payment by commercial insurance.
We test the applicability of these theories by matching to our prospectivity indices information on hospital competition, patient insurance mix, and patient demographic and hospital characteristics. We estimate the effect of these factors on our commercial and Medicare prospectivity indices, holding constant hospital and time fixed effects. We evaluate the economic importance, as well as the statistical significance, of these factors.
Our paper proceeds in four parts. Section II discusses the fundamental rationale behind prospective payment and the literature on the extent of variation in and the determinants of contract structure in markets for health care. Section III explains how we use data from HCCI on commercial insurance claims from Aetna, Humana, and UnitedHealthcare to characterize the extent of prospective payment, and how we supplement the HCCI data with other information on hospitals and the concentration of their markets. Section IV presents models of the determinants of hospital payment systems and our results, and Section V concludes.
II. Previous Research on Prospective Payment Systems and Determinants of Contract Structure
A large body of theoretical work, summarized by Newhouse (1996) , explains the fundamental trade-off associated with prospective payment for hospital services. Models of hospital payment systems generally assume that the unit prices of treatments are greater than marginal cost, hospital and physician efforts toward cost control are unobservable, and contracts that specify what treatments are appropriate are incomplete. Under these assumptions, purely fee-for-service payment encourages treatments that provide minimal clinical benefit and too little cost control. However, purely prospective payment encourages hospitals to avoid and skimp on the care of those who are costly to treat. The conclusion from these models is that the optimal payment system will be mixed, making hospitals responsible for some, but not all, of the risk of treating unexpectedly costly patients. The empirical effects of prospective payment have been extensively studied in the context of the Medicare program, which has paid hospitals according to the MPPS since 1984. According to a review of the literature by Pauly (2000, 557) , early research found that MPPS was associated with lower lengths of stay, profit margins, and spending growth without significant adverse consequences for patient health outcomes. McClellan (1997) and subsequent work points out, however, that the effects of MPPS are more varied and complex than overall assessments of it would suggest for two reasons.
First, although MPPS is prospective in name, in practice it reflects a more mixed approach to reimbursement. A hospital's MPPS payments are primarily based on its patients' DRGs, but many DRGs are related not to diagnoses but to the performance of specific intensive procedures. In addition, MPPS provides for additional "outlier" payments that compensate hospitals directly, at least in part, when a patient has unexpected need for costly additional services. Both of these factors lead MPPS to resemble fee-for-service payment more for some patients than for others.
Second, MPPS rules led not only to an increase in the financial risk borne by hospitals but also to a decline in payment generosity. Because the effects of higher-powered payment may mimic the effects of declining generosity, several papers have sought to identify separately the consequences of changes to "marginal" versus "average" Medicare payments (e.g., Sood et al. 2013) .
Fewer papers have studied commercial health insurance payment systems. Clemens, Gottlieb, and Molnar (2017) find that the schedule of payments for physician services used by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas is benchmarked to Medicare's resource-based relative value scale for 65 percent of spending. In an analysis of the hospital payment systems used by four large national insurers in selected metropolitan areas, Ginsburg (2010) finds that commercial insurance payments to hospitals are less prospective than MPPS. He characterizes hospital payment methods across geographic markets as one of three types: per diem, discounted charges, and DRG-based methods (either with or without outlier payments). He finds that commercial insurers pay hospitals by DRGs in approximately one-third of cases, ranging from 6 percent in Los Angeles to 44 percent in Milwaukee; the remainder of payments are made on a per diem or discounted-charge basis.
As Ginsburg (2010) observes, this presents a puzzle. In interviews, insurers expressed a preference for DRG-based payment, consistent with the evidence discussed above that MPPS led to lower medical spending growth without adverse effects on health outcomes. But because Medicare and almost all Medicaid programs also use DRGs, the adoption of DRGs for commercially insured patients would also benefit hospitals by reducing the incentive conflicts from different payers that hospitals face. Thus, unless the risk-bearing costs of DRGs exceed the benefits of lower spending growth and reduced incentive conflicts, there are unclaimed gains from commercial insurance payment system reform that are sufficient to make both insurers and hospitals better off.
One possible explanation for the puzzle is that hospitals with market power can earn higher profits by demanding not only higher prices but also lower-powered, fee-for-service contracts. Although this proposition is inconsistent with standard models in which sellers extract rents purely through higher prices (also known as the "one monopoly profit" hypothesis), these models may not capture the complexities of markets for health services. For example, if people who value health services more would prefer their insurer used lower-powered contracts with providers, then a provider with market power could increase profits by offering a menu of contracts to price discriminate among insurers. And even if people's valuations of health services are homogeneous, it may be in a monopoly seller's interest to offer contract terms that would differ from the competitive ones if doing so affected the price elasticity of demand. Both of these examples can be viewed as special cases of a market for a good with two attributes where the demand for the attributes is interrelated (Spence 1975) . If this explanation is correct, then failures of competition in hospital markets might lead not only to high prices-as previous research (e.g., Cooper et al. 2018 ) has shown-but also to fee-for-service payment that may discourage efficient production and contribute to health-care cost growth.
Economic theory also suggests that hospitals that serve patients with PPO insurance will be more likely to have low-powered contracts. HMOs and POS plans generally have more narrow networks than PPOs, which enable HMOs and POS plans to negotiate higher-powered contracts with hospitals using both the "carrot" of greater patient volume and the "stick" of the threat of exclusion (Dafny et al. 2017 ). In addition, by reducing any single hospital's patient volume, broad-network products increase both the risk and the transaction costs to the hospital of payment reform. For these reasons, understanding the extent to which commercial insurance hospital payment systems are prospective and the determinants of commercial payment systems' prospectivity are important health policy issues.
Two empirical papers present evidence consistent with this explanation. Gift, Arnould, and DeBrock (2002) analyze 1995 data on contract form from a large insurer in Washington State, matched with data on hospital characteristics from the Washington Department of Health, for 83 acute care facilities. They found 34 of the 83 hospitals used some form of prospective payment, and that the number of hospitals within 10 miles was positively associated with the probability of prospective payment. Town, Feldman, and Kralewski (2011) analyze data from 83 medical groups that contracted with Minnesota Blue Cross's "Blue Plus" plan in 2001, matched with data on medical group characteristics from the Community Tracking Survey. They found that share of revenue from capitation was positively associated with the number of physicians in the practice relative to the total number of physicians within 15 kilometers, and with physicians' self-reported assessment of their practice's market power.
Although these papers are suggestive, both have significant limitations. Both are based on selected small samples of facilities or practices from a single geographic area, and data from an earlier time period in which markets for health services were different from today. The research design of both is cross-sectional, leaving open the possibility that the observed association between payment system and competition may be due to other, unmeasured, characteristics of hospitals or areas. Finally, neither study provides a general way to quantify the extent of prospective payment in commercial insurance and compare it with a practical benchmark like MPPS.
Our paper seeks to address these limitations. We use nationwide data on payments to hospitals from HCCI to characterize the payment systems used by Aetna, Humana, and UnitedHealthcare. The HCCI data include information on the inpatient hospital claims for approximately 40 million individuals from all 50 states from 2008 to 2012, accounting for 27 percent of the nonelderly population covered by commercial insurance, making it one of the largest databases on the privately insured ever assembled. We also use data from the Medicare program in order to compare the extent of prospective payment in HCCI to the extent of prospective payment in MPPS, and to investigate whether prospective payment is correlated with hospital market competition and patient insurance. We hold constant hospital fixed effects, in order to control for all time-invariant characteristics of hospitals and geographic areas, as well as patient insurance type and a set of time-varying hospital characteristics.
III. Data
We use data from three sources: HCCI, the American Hospital Association (AHA) Survey, and the Medicare program. Each HCCI hospital claim includes the DRG and the "allowed amount, " representing the actual amount paid to the facility by the plan plus any deductibles or copayments. The HCCI data also contain information on each patient's age, gender, and type of insurance (HMO, POS, or PPO).
We follow McClellan (1997) and characterize the extent of each hospital's prospective payment by the share of its payments' variance that is explained by its patients' DRGs. This approach has several strengths. First, contracts between hospitals and insurers share costs of treating difficult patients in many ways. Although some cost-sharing occurs through outlier payments, cost-sharing also occurs through other terms such as all-inclusive per diem rates (which provide greater payments for patients with longer lengths of stay). This approach aggregates these different forms of cost-sharing into a single index proportional to revenues governed by each. Second, our commercial insurance claims contain information on the DRG of each patient's admission, even for claims not paid on a DRG basis. Because DRGs are the basis for MPPS (as well as most states' Medicaid hospital payment systems), they have become a standard claims characteristic. Third, for the same reason, DRG-based payment is a practical option against which commercial insurance contracts can be evaluated.
For each hospital in each year 2008-12, we calculate its MPPS prospectivity as follows. MPPS payment R i jk for patient i admitted to hospital j in geographic area k is determined by the patient's DRG weight ω i , the hospital's characteristics λ j , the geographic area's characteristics λ k , and other characteristics of the patient σ i jk :
We specify R i jk as the product of ω i and the payment shifters λ j , λ k , σ i jk because MPPS payments are derived from a complex formula that is multiplicative in the DRG weight, the base payment for all hospitals, and adjustments to the base payment that depend on the hospital's characteristics and geographic area.
The equation above implies that ln(R i jk ) can be written as the sum of three variables that depend on the DRG, the hospital, and all other characteristics of the patient:
Thus, we measure each hospital's MPPS prospectivity in a particular year as the proportion of variance in ln(R i jk ) that is explained by μ ω and π j , which is equal to the R 2 from a regression of the natural log of the hospital's MPPS payments on a set of DRG fixed effects. We calculate commercial insurance prospectivity in the same way to allow us to compare commercial insurance payments with Medicare using a common metric.
To each index, we match data on the distribution of the hospital's patients' age, gender, and insurance type; on hospital characteristics from AHA; and on hospital markets derived from Medicare claims. AHA hospital characteristics include teaching status, ownership (private nonprofit, private for-profit, or public), number of beds (<100, 100-300, >300), system status, and vertical integration with physicians. Following previous work (Baker, Bundorf, and Kessler 2014) , we divide vertically integrated hospitals into four groups: fully integrated organizations, closed physician/hospital organizations, open physician/hospital organizations, and independent practice associations. We use Medicare inpatient hospital claims from 2008 to 2012 to construct a measure of hospital market competitiveness, equal to the patient-flow-weighted average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman indices of admissions in each patient residential zip code served by the hospital, according to the method in Kessler and McClellan (2000) . We explain the construction of these variables in detail in an Online Appendix (http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/10 .1162/ajhe_a_00127). We limit our analysis to general medical/surgical, nonfederal hospitals in metropolitan statistical areas outside of Maryland 2 with at least 100 HCCI admissions in all of the years 2008-12. Tables 1 and 2 report the mean, standard deviation, and percentiles (for selected variables) of the variables used in analysis. All of these variables are measured at the hospital level; all descriptive statistics are weighted by the number of admissions. Table 1 shows that the extent of prospectivity in commercial insurance payments to hospitals is lower and more variable than the extent in MPPS. In 2008, for example, the average R 2 from a regression of commercial claims' allowed amounts on a set of DRG indicator variables is 0.747; by comparison, the average R 2 from a regression of total payments under MPPS on DRG indicators is 0.952. Even those hospitals with the most prospective commercial payments were not paid by commercial insurers as prospectively as they were paid by MPPS: the 90th percentile of commercial prospectivity across hospitals is 0.841, whereas the 10th percentile of MPPS prospectivity is 0.939. This is not surprising: Medicare uses a single nationwide reimbursement system that is based on DRGs, whereas commercial insurers use multiple reimbursement systems that may or may not be DRG based. By 2012, the level of commercial prospectivity had increased by almost one-half of a standard deviation, to 0.776; this occurred primarily because of increases in prospectivity at the bottom of the distribution. Table 1 also reports the 2008 and 2012 distributions of the hospital HerfindahlHirschman index; the share of commercial admissions attributable to HMO, POS, and PPO enrollees; the share of Medicare admissions (the number of Medicare admissions divided by the total as reported to AHA); and the number of commercial and MPPS admissions per DRG. The most striking trend in these variables is the shift among the commercially insured from HMO and PPO to POS insurance. Consistent with other analyses of HCCI data (Barrette and McGraves-Lloyd 2016) , the prevalence of POS insurance increased by 11.5 percentage points, whereas the prevalence of HMO and PPO insurance each decreased by around 6 percentage points. Table 2 reports 2012 means and standard deviations of the other independent variables, including the characteristics of commercial and MPPS patients and of hospitals. Table 3 shows that the extent of prospectivity in hospital reimbursement varies not only across hospitals but also across geographic areas. The table reports selected characteristics of the five largest core-based statistical areas (CBSAs), in terms of commercial admissions, in each quartile of the prospectivity distribution. The table shows that the weighted average share of hospital payment variance explained by DRG dummies ranges from 70 to 73 percent in low-prospectivity areas (such as Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, Florida) to 80-84 percent in high-prospectivity areas (such as Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, Minnesota). The table also shows that MPPS prospectivity is roughly constant across areas, ranging from 94 to 96 percent nationwide. Finally, the table shows that the extent of prospectivity is not obviously related to the average commercial price of a hospital admission. According to the fourth column, some CBSAs in both the lowest and 
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IV. Models and Results
For this reason, we model the commercial payment prospectivity of hospital j in year t, Y jt , as linear functions of the following variables, weighting each observation in the regression by the number of the hospital's commercial admissions: HHI jt Herfindahl-Hirschman index; X jt insurance mix: the proportion of commercial patients with HMO, POS, or PPO insurance (reference category is proportion PPO) and the proportion of all patients who are MPPS; 3 V jt age and gender mix: the proportion of patients aged 0-17, 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54 , and 55-64 years (reference category is proportion aged 55-64) and female; W jt other hospital characteristics (described above); Z jt number of admissions per DRG; 4 and ε jt an error term that we allow to be arbitrarily correlated within each hospital over time.
We also estimate the parameters in the equation above substituting hospitals' MPPS prospectivity for their commercial prospectivity as a placebo test. If the estimates of the effects of HHI jt and X jt from the commercial models are causal, then those variables should have no impact on MPPS prospectivity: MPPS is a single national program that is defined by statute, so market factors should not affect it. In the models that use MPPS prospectivity as the dependent variable, we omit the proportion of commercial patients with HMO, POS, or PPO insurance; substitute the proportion of patients aged 65-69, 70-74, 80-89, and 90-99 years in Medicare (reference category is proportion aged 75-79) for the commercial patient age mix; and weight each observation by the number of MPPS admissions. Table 4 presents estimates of the hospital HHI, insurance type, and time on the extent of commercial and MPPS prospectivity. According to the leftmost two columns, hospital market competition is significantly associated with increases in commercial prospectivity, holding constant hospital and time fixed effects, insurance type, and the characteristics of patients and hospitals. In particular, moving a hospital from the 75th to the 25th percentile of the 2012 HHI (a reduction in the HHI reflecting an increase in competition) would lead to an increase in commercial prospectivity of 1.2 percentage points. 5 Insurance type also has a statistically significant effect on commercial prospectivity. For plausible shifts in the mix of a hospital's commercial payors, the effect of insurance type is small: moving half of the average hospital's 2012 PPO patients to HMO or POS insurance (i.e., 6 percentage points) would lead to an increase in commercial prospectivity of 0.4 percentage points. 6 The effect of the proportion of patients paid under MPPS is somewhat larger. For example, increasing the proportion of MPPS patients from the 25th to the 75th percentile (i.e., by 10 percentage points) would lead to an increase in commercial prospectivity of 1 percentage point.
7 Taken together, these three factors explain an economically important (although not a majority) of the differences in prospectivity across hospitals. In 2012, for example, plausible shifts in hospital market competitiveness and insurance type could account for approximately 2.6 percentage points of the 8.9 percentage point difference between the 25th and 75th percentile of the prospectivity distribution, or approximately 30 percent. By contrast, according to the rightmost two columns of Table 4 , hospital HHI and the proportion of patients paid under MPPS do not have a statistically significant or economically important effect on MPPS prospectivity. This is consistent with a causal interpretation of the estimated effects of HHI and insurance type on commercial prospectivity; the observed correlation between these variables in the commercial context is not due to an artifact of our prospectivity measure, or to differential trends in case mix or hospital payments across hospitals over time, at least insofar as these trends would be reflected in MPPS payments.
V. Conclusion
Health economists have analyzed extensively the implications of "prospective" or "highpowered" payment for hospital services. A vast literature has modeled theoretically the trade-offs associated with prospective payment, and many studies have investigated the empirical consequences of Medicare's adoption of its own particular Prospective Payment System (MPPS). Wide agreement in the health policy community that MPPS successfully lowered relatively unproductive health spending has led researchers to propose extending the principles underlying it, in the form of "bundled payment" systems (Miller et al. 2011) .
Despite this, much less attention has been given to the determinants, or even the extent, of prospective or high-powered payment by commercial insurance plans. This gap is important. There is some evidence that commercial plans make less use of high-powered payment incentives than Medicare, and theoretical reasons to believe that this is due at least in part to failures in markets for hospital services or health insurance. Yet, little work has sought to test whether these hypotheses are correct, or even to assess the extent of prospective payment in commercial insurance at all.
In this paper, we use data from HCCI, the Medicare program, and the American Hospital Association Survey to investigate the association between the extent of prospective payment in commercial insurance, patient insurance mix, and hospital market competitiveness. We report three findings. First, the extent of prospectivity in commercial insurance payments to hospitals is lower and more variable than the extent in MPPS, although the extent of commercial insurance prospectivity has been slowly increasing over time. Second, the extent of prospectivity in payment systems varies not only across hospitals but also across geographic areas. Third, differences in hospital-level payment prospectivity is positively associated with three factors: the extent of hospital competition, the share of the hospital's commercially insured patients covered by managed care insurance, and the share of the hospital's patients covered by MPPS. We show that plausible differences in these three factors can explain around 30 percent of the variation in hospital-level prospectivity that we observe. Failures of competition in hospital markets are thus associated not only with high prices but also with fee-for-service payment that may discourage efficient production and contribute to health-care cost growth (Cooper et al. 2018) .
Our results have important implications for economic theory and public policy. The fact that hospitals facing less competition are more likely to be paid on a fee-for-service basis means that the "one monopoly profit" hypothesis does not accurately characterize markets for hospital services. This result also indicates a channel other than price through which hospital market power may affect social welfare: the terms of contracts with insurers. Although (as we discuss below) we are not able to say definitively whether the reduction in commercial payment prospectivity in uncompetitive hospital markets is harmful to consumers, the fact that even in competitive markets commercial payment prospectivity is significantly below that of MPPS-which is widely viewed as a success-is cause for concern.
We also find that insurance mix significantly affects the extent of commercial payment prospectivity. Hospitals serving patients with HMO or POS insurance have higher-powered incentives than do those serving patients with PPO insurance. This finding is consistent with both economic theory and anecdotal evidence. PPOs generally have broader hospital networks than do HMO or POS products, which gives each participating hospital less patient volume, thereby reducing insurers' bargaining power and increasing transaction and risk-bearing costs to hospitals. Recent analysis of a demonstration project to implement higher-powered payment incentives in commercial insurance contracts in California cited inadequate patient volume as the single largest reason the project did not succeed (Ridgely et al. 2014 ). In addition, we find that hospitals with a higher proportion of patients paid by MPPS have higher-powered commercial payment incentives. This is consistent with evidence that changes to incentives for treatment of one patient population "spill over" to outcomes of other populations (e.g., Chernew, Baicker, and Martin 2010) , and that changes in Medicare payment systems can facilitate private payment reform .
Our analysis has at least four limitations. First, we do not observe any actual contracts between insurers and hospitals; our analysis is based on a measure of contracts' payment incentives that we construct from claims data. Although there are strong reasons to believe that our measure is correlated with the terms of the underlying agreements, this is an assumption that we cannot test. Second, because our analysis is observational in nature, the association we observe between prospectivity, hospital market competition, and insurance mix may be due to endogeneity rather than a causal connection. To address this concern, we control for hospital and time fixed effects and time-varying characteristics of hospitals, markets, and patient populations. We hypothesize that any remaining, unobserved, factors that would increase prospectivity would lead us to underestimate the magnitude of the effects of hospital market competitiveness: to the extent that increases in prospectivity lead to lower hospital revenues or profits, it would lead to more hospital closures, which would tend to increase the hospital HHI and bias its estimated (negative) effect on prospectivity towards zero. Nonetheless, we cannot rule out the possibility of an unobserved time-varying characteristic of hospitals or geographic areas that is positively correlated with prospectivity and negatively correlated with the HHI or the share of commercial enrollees in PPO insurance. Third, although the HCCI database includes claims for more than 27 percent of the nonelderly population covered by commercial insurance, it does not include claims from every insurer. In particular, the HCCI database does not include claims from Blue Cross or Blue Shield affiliates, so to the extent that hospital contracts with Aetna, Humana, and UnitedHealthcare differ materially from contracts with Blue Cross or Blue Shield affiliates, our results may not generalize to hospital contracts on the whole. Fourth, because we do not examine patient health outcomes or health spending, we cannot make a definitive welfare assessment of the reduced prospectivity we observe in uncompetitive hospital markets. Although previous empirical work on MPPS suggests that the use of low-powered payment in commercial insurance is inefficient, future research should consider this hypothesis directly.
